Attitudes and Behaviour in the Second Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon

Richard Sinnott and Johan A. Elkink Geary Institute and School of Politics and International Relations University College Dublin

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#### Introduction

Twice within the last decade, Irish government proposals to ratify new EU treaties have been defeated by referendum (the referendum on the Treaty of Nice in 2001 and that on the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008). Both outcomes were reversed in follow-on referendums within a year or so of the defeat. Although the net outcome in each case was that Ireland could proceed to ratify the EU treaties in question, the experience was not one that any Irish government would wish to repeat. In this context, our report on attitudes and behaviour in the first Lisbon referendum concluded by noting the "undeniable need" to address the issue of public support for the process of European integration "not just now and not just in the run-up to a referendum but on an on-going and long-term basis".<sup>1</sup>

Our ability to analyse Irish attitudes to European integration and the behaviour consequent on such attitudes has been significantly enhanced by the decision to conduct a postreferendum poll not just after the 2008 referendum NO but also after the 2009 referendum YES. Beginning with a summary of the main trends in voting in Irish EU referendums, this report analyses the sources of the YES and NO votes and of abstention in the 2009 Lisbon referendum. Fieldwork for the poll was conducted by Millward Brown Lansdowne between 20<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2009. The poll, which had a sample size of 1,002 respondents, was designed to be representative of all persons aged 18+ who were eligible to vote. Quotas were set according to the 2006 census, based on region, sex, age and socio-economic group. The advantages of a post referendum survey of the kind just described lie in the wealth of data it provides. The most fundamental is the evidence of reported voting behaviour including not just how the respondents voted in 2009 but also their recall of whether and how they voted in the first Lisbon referendum the previous year. Media use also falls into this category of reported behaviour as do various aspects of campaign exposure. The survey also makes it possible to measure a wide array of attitudes, ranging from sense of national and European identity to particular preferences regarding policies and processes in the European arena. Finally the survey enables us to also relate voting behaviour to the demographic fundamentals of age, sex and status.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Richard Sinnott, Johan A. Elkink, Kevin O'Rourke and James McBride, 'Attitudes and Behaviour in the Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon: Report prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs', 6 March 2009, pp. 1-61, www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/uploads/documents/ucd%20geary%20institute%20report.pdf

#### Trends and in voting and vote outcomes in EU referendums in Ireland

The exceptional nature of the two defeats on the issue of the ratification of EU treaty changes is clearly illustrated in Figure 1, which shows a YES vote ranging from 62 per cent to 83 per cent in six of the eight referendums, compared to 46 and 47 per cent in the first Nice and first Lisbon referendums respectively. The similarity in the size of the percentage YES votes in these two referendums might suggest that the behaviour of the electorate in them was more or less the same and that all that was needed in response to the Lisbon referendum defeat in 2008 was to apply the lessons that had been learned in the two referendums on the Nice treaty back in 2001 and 2002.




Figure 1: Yes and No percentage of valid poll in European Referendums in Ireland 1972-2009 (%)

Source of data: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government Referendum Results 1972-2009 Note: Valid votes only.

The assumption of a strong similarity between Nice I and Lisbon I is,<sup>2</sup> however, an oversimplification. It is true that the results of the two referendums in terms of first preference vote were very similar. It is also true, as we shall see below, that knowledge, or the lack of it, played an important role in bringing about those similar results.<sup>3</sup> In several other respects, however, the first Nice and first Lisbon referendums were actually very

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Roman numerals I and II are used to designate the first and second Nice referendums and the first and second Lisbon referendums.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> We shall look at the similarities and differences in the role of knowledge in all four recent EU referendums presently.

different. The main differences lay (a) in the rate of abstention (66 per cent in the first Nice contest compared to 47 per cent in the first Lisbon one) and (b) in the size of the NO vote — 19 per cent of the electorate in Nice I compared to 28 per cent in Lisbon I (see Figure 2). This makes it clear that YES campaigners faced a much bigger challenge in the second Lisbon referendum compared to the challenge they had faced in the second Nice referendum. In the second Nice referendum, the challenge lay mainly in getting out the vote. In contrast, the challenge in the second Lisbon referendum was mainly a matter of reversing the significant surge in support for the NO side that, as Figure 2 shows, was a marked feature of the vote that rejected the treaty in 2008.





Figure 2: Yes, No and Abstained in European Referendums in Ireland as a percentage of the electorate 1972-2009

Furthermore, while the fundamental issue at stake was the same in the 2008 and 2009 referendums, both the policy context in which the question was being asked and the political/economic situation in which the referendum was taking place were very different. By late 2009, the international banking crisis and the ensuing economic recession had exposed a property bubble *and* a national banking crisis *and* a full blown fiscal crisis *and* a substantial loss of international competitiveness as the underlying vulnerabilities of what had been seen as the indomitable Celtic Tiger. By autumn 2009 Irish people's positive evaluation of the Irish economy had plummeted from over 80 per cent at the height of the Celtic Tiger boom to a mere 12 per cent — see Figure 3. Other countries had also suffered a

fall in economic confidence but the Irish fall was from a higher crest to a much lower trough. Other factors also affected the context of the second referendum, notably a series of legal guarantees which the Government had negotiated with the other EU member states. The campaign leading up to the second referendum was also very different, involving as it did the participation of a variety of civil society groups mainly supporting the Treaty. This background will need to be taken into account as we seek to identify the factors that influenced the voters in the second Lisbon referendum.



We begin by documenting the flow of the vote—where the votes came from and where they went, including the uncast votes of those in the electorate who abstained. Table 1 shows how YES voters, NO voters and abstainers in the first Lisbon referendum behaved when it came to the second contest.<sup>4</sup> It is clear that the YES vote remained exceptionally solid—87 percent of 2008 YES voters voted YES again in 2009. The big change occurred

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For all tables with percentages and counts, a weighting scheme has been applied. Because there is a significantly larger proportion of respondents who report having voted than the actual turnout, and a significantly larger proportion reporting they voted YES, a weight has been applied to bring these proportions in line with the population. The regression analyses below, however, have not been weighted. Weights based on the dependent variable itself, e.g. to correct for having more YES voters when explaining why people vote YES, only affect the estimate of the intercept, not of the effects of the various independent variables. We are only interested in the latter.

among those who voted NO in 2008—25 per cent shifted to the YES side and 33 per cent abstained, leaving only just over two in every five 2008 NO voters persisting in rejecting the treaty. Then there were those who abstained in 2008: 73 per cent of them abstained again in 2009, 17 per cent voted YES and 9 per cent voted NO. Thus the short answer to the question as to how the YES side won is that their own 2008 vote remained remarkably solid (to the tune of 87 per cent), they managed to persuade one in four of those who had voted NO to switch to YES and, despite a high rate of persistent abstention, they succeeded in mobilizing and obtaining the votes of one-sixth of those who had abstained in 2008.

	Voting behaviour in 2008				
	Yes	No	Abstain		
ting behaviour in 2009					
Yes	87	25	17		
No	1	42	9		
Abstain	12	32	73		
Total	100	100	100		
Ν	340	379	275		

Table 1: Voter transition matrix Lisbon I 2008 to Lisbon II 2009

Source of data: Department of Foreign Affairs/Millward Brown 2008 and 2009

There is of course a longer answer to the question of why the YES side won that seeks to explain (i) participation versus abstention in 2009, (ii) voting YES versus voting NO in the second referendum and (iii) switching from NO to YES between the two referendums. We pursue these three lines of inquiry using, as a preliminary strategy, the subjective accounts of their actions that the voters (more accurately, the electors) themselves have given.

#### Reasons given for voters' behaviour

Voters' own accounts of their behaviour are particularly useful in the analysis of abstention as they make clear that there are two types of abstention, namely circumstantial and voluntary. As the name suggests, circumstantial abstention arises when the individual encounters some practical obstacle to voting such as absence from home or difficulty getting to the polling station or being registered at another address etc. Voluntary abstention, on the other hand, is a function of an individual's negative outlook on, or negative experience of, the political process or political issues. Each of these two main types of abstention requires a different kind of policy or political response, circumstantial abstention requiring greater voter facilitation and voluntary abstention being more likely to respond to greater voter mobilization.

In the context of this report, the main interest must lie with the sources of voluntary abstention. Table 2 shows that in the last four EU referendums in Ireland voluntary abstention has tended to take two main forms—lack of understanding/information and lack of interest. Note in particular that lack of understanding is significantly higher in the first of each pair of referendums, i.e. in Nice I compared with Nice II and in Lisbon I compared with Lisbon II, though lack of understanding did not decline quite as much in Lisbon II as it had done in Nice II.

Examination of reasons for voting NO also reveals some similarities between Nice I and Lisbon I and between Nice II and Lisbon II. Thus the highest ranked item in Lisbon II is "bad idea in general" at 26 per cent; this response appears with the same frequency in Nice II. Similarly, on the issue of lack of information as a reason for voting NO, Nice I and Lisbon I are very alike on 39 and 40 per cent respectively and are very different from Nice II and Lisbon II on 14 per cent and 20 per cent. However, reasons for voting NO do not entirely follow this pattern. For example, loss of sovereignty as a reason for voting NO was mentioned by 22 per cent of Lisbon II NO voters but by only 8 per cent of Nice II NO voters. Similarly, neutrality and military issues were reasons for voting NO among 17 per cent of Nice II NO voters but only among 4 per cent of Lisbon II NO voters.

	Nice I	Nice II	Lisbon I	Lisbon II
	%	%	%	%
oluntary				
Lack of understanding/Lack of information	44	26	46	34
Not interested/Not bothered	20	32	16	19
ircumstantial				
On holiday/Away from home	15	13	19	13
Too busy/Work constraints	8	9	8	9
Registration/Voting card problems	10	16	6	6
Illness/Disability	4	4	3	6
Other	0	5	12	2
Ν	630	395	985	257

#### Table 2: Reasons for abstention in the Nice and Lisbon referendums

#### Note: Percentages may add to more than 100 on account of multiple responses.

Source of data : ECR Nice I, ECR Nice II and Department of Foreign Affairs/Millward Brown 2008 and 2009

Reasons for voting YES are quite different in form to reasons given for voting NO. Thus YES voters tend to give broad responses that fall into a small number of categories ("EU good for Ireland" or "The right thing to do"); whereas NO voters' responses are spread over a larger number of more specific response categories—compare Tables 3 and 4. YES responses in Lisbon II are even more concentrated in a couple of broad categories than Lisbon I responses were, with over 80 per cent responding in this very global fashion. There is, however, one striking difference between the responses in Lisbon I and Lisbon II and that relates to the economy. In Lisbon I only 3 per cent referred to economic issues, voters being quite unaware of what was coming at them from around the corner. This proportion jumped to 20 per cent in Lisbon II (as some may have expected an even larger preoccupation with the economy in Lisbon II, this is a topic we will come back to later in the analysis).

	Nice I	Nice II	Lisbon I	Lisbon II
	%	%	%	%
Bad idea in general	7	25	13	26
Loss of sovereignty/independence	16	8	18	22
Lack of information	39	14	42	20
Negative reaction to perceived pressure to vote YES			8	15
Anti-govt/Anti-politician		10	9	9
Neutrality and military issues	12	17	8	4
Abortion issue	1	1	2	2
Advice of family/friends	1	2	1	2
Influence of political party, politician, TV debate	6	5	5	0
Loss of Irish Commissioner on rotating basis			4	0
Loss of control over taxation			3	0
Would create refugee problems/immigration	3	11	1	0
Other/Don't know	15	21	13	7
Ν	300	223	597	263

#### Table 3: Reasons for voting NO in the Nice and Lisbon referendums

#### Note: Percentages may add to more than 100 on account of multiple responses.

#### Source of data : ECR Nice I, ECR Nice II and Department of Foreign Affairs/Millward Brown 2008 and 2009

As indicated above, these subjective responses as to why the voters did or did not act in a particular way are useful but limited. Their usefulness is clear. Their limitations arise from the fact that they are spontaneous answers to open ended questions and, as such, they tend to be partial and unreflective responses (often no more than a couple of words or at most a line). As such, they are likely to leave much out; hence the need to bring into the analysis all the other things we have learned about the voters in the survey, from their basic demographics to their experiences of and attitudes to European and domestic issues. In order to exploit the wealth of data involved we use multivariate statistical analysis focusing on the three things to be explained as outlined above, namely turning out to vote rather than abstaining in 2009, voting YES rather than NO in 2009 and switching from NO to YES

between 2008 and 2009. Before presenting the results of these analyses, we briefly outline the multivariate research strategy involved.

	Lisbon I	Lisbon II
	%	%
EU good for Ireland/better in EU	39	42
The right thing to do/best for country	32	40
Good for economy/jobs/taxes/EU funding	3	20
Government/ Pol parties/Bus Leaders/Media in favour	10	8
Better for agriculture/IFA influence	2	2
Negative reaction to No campaign	4	2
Reassured guarantees	0	1
Persuaded by family/friends	2	1
Other/Don't know	0	1
Ν	563	543

#### Table 4: Reasons for voting YES in the Lisbon referendums

Note: Percentages may add to more than 100 on account of multiple responses.

Source of data: DFA/Millward Brown 2008 and 2009

#### The core research strategy

Our multivariate<sup>5</sup> research strategy focuses on a number of statistical models with a view to identifying the connections between voters' attitudes and other characteristics and their voting behaviour, i.e. turning out to vote (or not) and voting YES or NO. Following a brief overview of the socio-demographic correlates of the vote, the analysis will examine the impact of the guarantees and assurances that the Irish government negotiated with its European partners. These guarantees were designed to deal with certain specific issues that research had shown to have had a significant impact on how people had voted in the first

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In the statistical literature, "multivariate regression" can refer to either having multiple independent or explanatory variables, or to having multiple dependent variables. In this context, we refer to the former.

Lisbon referendum report.<sup>6</sup> The guarantees/assurances addressed the issues of membership of the European Commission, control of tax policy, neutrality, abortion, workers' rights and public services. Awareness of three of these (the commissionership, tax and ethical issues) was measured in the present survey.


In analysing the impact of these guarantees on voting choice in the second referendum, it will be important to take account of the effect of people's overall knowledge of the European Union. The question is whether knowledge of the guarantees had an effect that is independent of people's knowledge of the EU or whether any such effect was simply a reflection of what we know to be the positive impact of high levels of knowledge of the EU on propensity to vote YES in referendums on EU treaties.

Apart from the guarantees, there was a second factor that was specific to the second Lisbon referendum and that was the already noted perilous state of the economy. The economic crisis was a major feature of the context in which the referendum took place. In the wake of the referendum, some indeed argued that the severity of the crisis had driven the voters into the YES camp and that people had voted YES on the basis of panic rather than on the basis of a conviction that the Lisbon Treaty was, on balance, a development that should be supported. All this suggests that, in any attempt to get at the causes of voting in the referendum, particular attention will need to be paid to the impact of economic experiences and expectations.

Analysis of the impact of economic factors raises a related issue, i.e. the possibility that the outcome of the referendum could have been driven by widespread dissatisfaction with the incumbent government parties and so was not really about European issues at all. This is in fact a common interpretation (and criticism) of referendums as such, that argues that electorates can feel so negatively about the governing party(ies) that they would vote NO in any referendum in order to give vent to their dissatisfaction with the government. Obviously, this was not a huge factor in Lisbon II since, although the vast majority of people at that time were dissatisfied with the government, only one-third of the voters (amounting to 19 per cent of the electorate) voted NO. Indeed, an examination of the relationship

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Richard Sinnott, Johan A. Elkink, Kevin O'Rourke and James McBride, 'Attitudes and Behaviour in the Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon: Report prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs', 6 March 2009, pp. 1-61, www.foreignaffairs.gov.ie/uploads/documents/ucd%20geary%20institute%20report.pdf

between government satisfaction and vote choice in recent Irish EU referendums indicates that government dissatisfaction has had limited impact on any of the outcomes in question. As Figure 4 shows, there have been five EU related referendums since 1998. In the first (Amsterdam), government satisfaction was high and the treaty was approved. In the second (Nice I) government satisfaction was still high and the treaty was rejected. In the third (Nice II) government satisfaction was low and the treaty was approved. In the fourth (Lisbon I) satisfaction was low and the treaty was rejected. And in the fifth (Lisbon II) government satisfaction was through the floor and the treaty was approved. In short, government satisfaction can be substantially up or down without having a commensurate effect on EU referendum outcomes. Acknowledging all that, however, we still need to know the extent to which the NO vote in Lisbon II was boosted by the prevailing very high rate of dissatisfaction with the incumbent government; we will, accordingly, be including a variable measuring government satisfaction/dissatisfaction at this point in the analysis.



This brings us to the issues that a referendum on European treaty changes ought to be about, i.e. people's attitudes to European integration, ranging from feelings about national/European identity and attitudes to European integration as a whole to detailed

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issues such as EU regulation of small companies and enterprises. And so the next and final step in the analysis of vote choice will be to include Europe-related attitudes in the regression model. We begin, however, with the socio-demographics of YES/NO vote choice.

#### The socio-demographics

Looked at from a purely socio-demographic perspective, there are some quite strong associations with voting YES versus NO in the second Lisbon referendum (see Model 1 in Table 5<sup>7</sup>). Thus, in comparison with those in upper middle class occupations, there was a substantial propensity for voters with lower middle class or skilled or unskilled working class occupations to vote NO and likewise in the case of small farmers. On the other hand, being older and having third-level education were positively correlated with the YES vote whereas vote choice appears to have been unrelated to gender. Two aspects of the findings set out in the purely socio-demographic model in Table 5 should be emphasised. The first is that the variables in question really are correlated with the vote—the evidence is telling us that there were differences in the voting behaviour of people in different socio-demographic groups. Important as this finding is in itself, it actually raises a second aspect that will reoccur as the analysis proceeds, i.e. what are the class-related attitudes and perceptions that account for the observed socio-demographic findings in Model 1 in Table 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> For each of the models, the main numbers in the table are the regression coefficients. These coefficients indicate the effect of each variable on the probability to vote YES. A positive coefficient indicates a positive effect on this probability-a respondent who scores high on this variable is more likely to vote YES-and a negative coefficient indicates a lower probability. Due to standardization of the explanatory variables, the coefficients are comparable: a larger coefficient implies a stronger effect. For most variables, the effect is relative to a reference category, as indicated in the notes below the table. For example, the effect for the 18-24 age group is relative to the 65+ age group-a statistically significant effect here implies that this group is statistically more likely or less likely to vote YES than the 65+ group. It should be emphasized that the effects shown take into account the effects of all the other variables: the lack of any age or class effects in Models 2 and 3 can be explained by the fact that all these effects are fully captured by the attitudinal variables in the model. Finally, the number in parenthesis below each coefficient provides an indication of the certainly of the estimate. A large number indicates a low level of certainty. For ease of interpretation, we added stars to the various coefficients. A coefficient with two stars is clearly statistically significant-there is a high probability that the effect we observe of this explanatory variable on the probability to vote YES cannot be ascribed to chance. One star indicates weaker statistical significance-the probability that this effect is due to pure chance is somewhat higher (up to 10 per cent instead of up to 5 per cent as in the case of two stars). No stars implies that this probability is larger than 10 per cent.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	<b>1.01</b> (0.43) **	-0.06 (0.49)	1.39 (0.74) *	1.16 (1.24)
Female	- <b>0.08</b> (0.16)	0.09 (0.17)	0.02 (0.22)	0.03 (0.35)
Age	0.48 (0.17) **	0.34 (0.18) *	0.16 (0.23)	0.53 (0.38)
Lower middle class	- <b>0.48</b> (0.29) *	-0.23 (0.29)	-0.38 (0.37)	-0.27 (0.60)
Skilled working class	- <b>0.93</b> (0.31) **	-0.57 (0.31) *	-0.66 (0.39) *	-0.51 ( <sup>0.58</sup> )
Unskilled working class	- <b>0.84</b> (0.31) **	-0.48 (0.31)	-0.36 (0.40)	-0.10 (0.60)
Large farmer	<b>0.04</b> (0.50)	0.25 (0.53)	-0.21 (0.57)	-0.60 (0.97)
Small farmer	<b>-1.00</b> (0.60) *	-0.63 (0.62)	-0.21 (0.86)	0.85 (1.08)
Secondary education	<b>0.14</b> (0.35)	0.09 (0.38)	0.33 (0.43)	-0.20 <i>(0.86)</i>
Third level education	0.69 (0.40) *	0.46 (0.42)	0.72 (0.49)	-0.24 (0.98)
Guarantee Irish commissioner		0.56 (0.20) **	0.33 (0.24)	0.04 (0.45)
Guarantee corporate tax rate		<b>0.56</b> (0.19) **	0.50 (0.23) **	-0.31 (0.45)
Guarantee abortion policy		0.08 (0.20)	0.04 (0.23)	0.36 (0.45)
Knowledge scale		<b>0.61</b> (0.22) **	0.52 (0.25) **	0.58 (0.55)
Dissatisfied own economic situation			-0.19 (0.21)	0.21 (0.34)
Yes vote improve economic prospects			<b>2.58</b> (0.25) **	2.74 (0.42) **
Dissatisfaction government			-0.95 (0.41) **	-1.49 (0.61) **
Close to opposition party			-0.46 (0.27) *	0.07 (0.47)
Not close to any party			- <b>0.47</b> (0.28) *	-0.13 (0.45)
Irish only identity				- <b>0.74</b> (0.38) *
Anti-immigration				<b>0.86</b> (0.38) **
Membership EU good				<b>2.50</b> (0.53) **
Anti-integrated foreign policy				<b>-1.47</b> (0.34) **
Big countries too much power				<b>-1.14</b> (0.40) **
Too many EU decisions				- <b>0.91</b> (0.42) **
Unification gone too far				- <b>0.97</b> (0.40) **
Too much regulation companies				- <b>0.71</b> (0.43) *
Pro-neutrality				- <b>0.44</b> (0.34)
Attitude to abortion				- <b>0.27</b> (0.56)
Knowledge abortion * attitude abortion	n			<b>0.97</b> (0.83)
N	756	750	679	476

Table 5: Multivariate regression models explaining the probability of a respondent voting YES in the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty

Standard errors are in brackets.

\* significant at  $\alpha$  = 0.10; \*\* significant at  $\alpha$  = 0.05

Notes:

1) The social class categories are all relative to the upper middle class category;

2) The education categories are all relative to those with only primary level education;

3) The dissatisfaction with the government variable reports those who are (very) dissatisfied relative to those who are either neutral or satisfied;
4) The dissatisfaction with the economy variable reports those who consider their own economic situation to be very or fairly bad, relative to those who are neutral or consider their economic situation to be good;

5) The age variable is relative to those who are 65+;

6) These are logistic regression models with the independent variables standardised, including all respondents who reported to have voted in the referendum and with list-wise deletion of missing values.

#### Awareness of the guarantees and knowledge of the EU

In line with the research strategy set out above, the next step in the analysis is to introduce the three variables measuring people's awareness of aspects of the guarantees and assurances that the Irish government negotiated with its European partners. The aspects included in the questionnaire relate to Ireland's retention of control of sensitive ethical issues such as abortion, Ireland's retention of control of its own tax rates and Ireland and all other states to have a commissioner. Analysis along these lines indicates that awareness of the assurance regarding the commissionership and awareness of the guarantee regarding the retention of the control over taxation were both associated with voting YES. However, the third item (awareness of the guarantee of Irish retention of control of ethical issues including abortion) does not seem to bear any relationship to how a person voted (see Model 2 in Table 5). This is a puzzling result and one that we will come back to at the end of this analysis. For now we can simply note that the impact of the two guarantees that do appear to be related to vote choice (the commissionership and taxation) is not simply a reflection of the tendency for people who are well informed about European issues and processes to vote YES in EU-related referendums. This is demonstrated by Model 2 in Table 5 which shows the effect of the voters' level of EU knowledge. This model confirms earlier research which shows that knowledge of the EU is related to vote choice—the higher a person's level of knowledge on this scale, the more likely that person is to vote YES.<sup>8</sup> Model 2 also demonstrates that awareness of the guarantees regarding tax and the commissionership had an effect on voting that is not reducible to the general effect of knowledge of the EU.

## The economy and domestic politics

In addition to highlighting the guarantees, the YES campaign argued that full involvement in the European Union was essential for Irish economic recovery and that a NO vote would put Ireland's role in the EU in jeopardy. The NO campaign denied that there was any connection between Irish ratification of the treaty and economic recovery and argued that ratification

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The measure of knowledge of the EU is based on three items in the questionnaire—a measure of objective knowledge of the EU and two measures of subjective knowledge (self assessed knowledge of the EU and self assessed knowledge of the Lisbon Treaty).

would not save or create a single job. Apart from these campaign arguments, some commentators felt that there was a panic factor at work. According to this interpretation, severe anxiety about their own economic situation was responsible for driving large numbers of voters into the YES camp and was a major factor, if not indeed *the* major factor, affecting the outcome of the referendum.

In teasing out the impact of these economic factors, we can examine the evidence provided by two questions in the post-referendum survey. The first question looks at people's expectations regarding Ireland's economic prospects given a YES vote. The wording was: "Do you think that, as a result of the YES vote in the Lisbon Treaty referendum, Ireland's economic prospects have been improved or disimproved or remain unchanged?" This question addresses the campaign argument about the economic implications of a YES vote and one would expect that those with positive expectations would have tended to vote YES and those with negative expectations would have tended to vote NO.

The second question seeks to identify people's evaluation of their own economic situation. The question asks "What about your own economic situation these days? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?" According to the "panic" interpretation of the outcome of the referendum, respondents who feel that their economic situation is fairly or very bad should be more likely to have voted YES.

Both these economic variables are included in Model 3 in Table 5. The results show that any anxieties respondents may have had about their own economic situation had no discernible effect on their vote. The variable measuring evaluation of one's own economic situation has an entirely negligible and statistically insignificant effect. However, voters do appear to have been strongly influenced to vote YES by our second economic variable, i.e. by the perception that there was a link between voting YES and an improvement in Ireland's economic prospects. In short, there is no evidence that the YES vote was driven by the negative personal economic circumstances in which many individuals found themselves. However, there is very firm evidence that the expectation that a YES vote would lead to an improvement in the country's economic prospects substantially increased the propensity to vote YES.

The role played (or not played) by voters' economic experiences and expectations raises the perennial question of whether voters who are dissatisfied with the government use a referendum as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction.<sup>9</sup> In this case, however, one doesn't need multivariate statistics to show that the majority of the voters did not treat this referendum as a plebiscite on the popularity of the government. Had they done so, the outcome would have been a resounding defeat for the YES side. Be that as it may, the question remains as to whether dissatisfaction with the government played any role in the outcome. Perhaps the YES vote would have been even higher if the referendum had not occurred during a national and international economic crisis that gave rise to widespread dissatisfaction with the governing parties. In order to test these ideas we have included dissatisfaction with the way the government is running the country and a feeling of being close to an opposition party or to no party in Model 3 in Table 5. The results show that dissatisfaction with the way the government was running the country did increase the propensity to vote NO, as did the feeling of being close to one of the opposition parties. In order to assess the size of the impact of these factors, however, we need to include in the analysis the full range of attitudes to European issues in so far as these are measured in the questionnaire.

#### European issues and attitudes

Inclusion of EU-related attitudes in the model shows that two attitudinal variables played a particularly important role in determining vote choice in the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. The two key variables are (i) the already noted perception of a link between a YES vote on the Lisbon Treaty and an improvement in Ireland's economic prospects<sup>10</sup> and (ii) the belief that Ireland's membership of the EU is a good thing. The more or less equal weight given to these variables by the analysis indicates that the economy was an important factor but not an overriding one. Positive expectations regarding improvement in Ireland's economic prospects as a result of the YES vote played a vital role but overall positive evaluation of Ireland's membership of the EU was also a key factor.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> This is the nub of a theory of referendums that regards them as plebiscites on the (un)popularity of the incumbent government or, in the jargon, as "second-order elections".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See the discussion of Model 3 above.

The analysis in Model 4 also confirms the earlier finding regarding the effect of domestic politics on the outcome, showing that dissatisfaction with the government did increase the likelihood of voting NO but only as one variable among many. In short, as with the first Lisbon treaty there is no evidence to support the view that this was all about passing judgment on the performance of the incumbent government. A further qualification is that inclusion of EU-related attitudes in Model 4 makes the effect of feeling close to an opposition party insignificant. This suggests that this sense of attachment to an opposition party is only significant in Model 3 because it is associated with negative attitudes to the EU and that, once these attitudes are taken into account, as they are in Model 4, the opposition-party effect disappears.

Certain other attitudes to European integration tended to increase the NO vote. These attitudes are included in Model 4. In brief, they are:

- opposition to the further integration of European foreign policy;
- having an Irish-only identity (as opposed to some degree of European and Irish identity);
- believing that big countries have too much power;
- believing that that European integration has gone too far;
- taking the view that there is too much EU regulation in general and specifically in relation to companies.

The effect of attitude to immigration is surprising (see Table 5). One might have expected that the tendency to vote NO would increase among those who agreed with the proposition that "people from other countries coming to live here makes Ireland a worse place to live in". It turns out that anti-immigration sentiment, insofar as it is measured by this question, is more associated with voting YES. When we look at only the attitude towards immigration and the vote, voters who feel immigration has made life in Ireland worse are more likely to vote NO but, when we take into account the array of other EU-related attitudes, this effect goes into reverse. In short, attitude towards immigration does thus not have a strong negative impact in itself. However, it is closely connected to other relevant attitudes and the impact on vote choice is not straightforward.

#### Awareness of the guarantee on ethical issues and attitude to abortion

As indicated in the discussion above, before finalizing this analysis we need to return to the preliminary finding in Model 2 that indicated that awareness of the ethical guarantee appeared to have no effect on vote choice. Before definitely concluding that the ethical guarantee had no impact and that it was therefore superfluous, we need to consider the possibility that the impact of awareness of the guarantee may be affected by people's attitude to abortion. This is a classic example of what is known in statistics as a (potential) interaction effect and we can test for the hypothesised interaction by including two additional variables in Model 4, namely attitude to abortion and a term representing the interaction between attitude to abortion and awareness of the guarantee on ethical issues (the latter variable being already in the analysis since Model 2). The hypothesis is that awareness of the guarantee on ethical issues does have an effect on a person's vote but that this effect is contingent on the person's attitude to abortion—those who are anti-abortion being more likely to be affected by their awareness of the guarantee and, accordingly, more likely to vote YES. The positive sign of the last coefficient in Model 4 certainly supports our theoretical expectation but the evidence is only suggestive; the variation among voters and the size of the sample are such that we have insufficient evidence to definitely conclude that this interaction effect exists.

So far we have sought to explain the choice the voters made as between YES and NO, i.e. to ratify or not to ratify the Lisbon Treaty in the referendum of October 2009. Of course, the 2009 referendum was not a one-off event. The electorate had been around the course before and, crucially, a significant number of voters switched from NO in Lisbon I to YES in Lisbon II. Explaining their behaviour is an essential element in accounting for the decision to ratify the treaty in October 2009. This second analysis takes all those who voted NO in the first Lisbon referendum and seeks to explain why some switched to YES in 2009 while others voted NO in both contests.

	Model 4 from Table 5	Switching model
Intercept	1.16 (1.24)	-2.10 -(2.55)
Female	0.03 (0.35)	0.74 (0.57)
Age	0.53 (0.38)	0.60 (0.80)
Lower middle class	-0.27 (0.60)	-2.36 (1.03) **
Skilled working class	-0.51 (0.58)	-1.30 (1.13)
Unskilled working class	-0.10 (0.60)	-0.62 (0.92)
Large farmer	-0.60 (0.97)	-2.54 (1.54)
Small farmer	0.85 (1.08)	0.96 (1.72)
Secondary education	-0.20 (0.86)	0.25 (1.28)
Third level education	-0.24 (0.98)	-0.33 (1.36)
Guarantee Irish commissioner	0.04 (0.45)	1.37 (1.01)
Guarantee corporate tax rate	-0.31 (0.45)	-0.47 (1.04)
Guarantee abortion policy	0.36 (0.45)	0.35 (1.18)
Knowledge scale	0.58 (0.55)	-0.39 (0.85)
Dissatisfied own economic situation	0.21 (0.34)	0.69 (0.56)
Yes vote improve economic prospects	2.74 (0.42) **	3.43 (0.70) **
Dissatisfaction government	-1.49 (0.61) **	-0.82 (0.88)
Close to opposition party	0.07 (0.47)	-0.68 (0.93)
Not close to any party	-0.13 (0.45)	-0.89 (1.06)
rish only identity	-0.74 (0.38) *	-0.03 (0.68)
Anti-immigration	0.86 (0.38) **	1.21 (0.75)
Membership EU good	2.50 (0.53) **	3.68 (1.13) **
Anti-integrated foreign policy	-1.47 (0.34) **	-2.28 (0.76) **
Big countries too much power	-1.14 (0.40) **	-1.93 (0.75) **
Too many EU decisions	-0.91 (0.42) **	-0.63 (0.60)
Jnification gone too far	-0.97 (0.40) **	-0.17 (0.59)
Too much regulation companies	-0.71 (0.43) *	-0.95 (0.71)
Pro-neutrality	-0.44 (0.34)	-1.56 (0.59) **
Attitude to abortion	-0.27 (0.56)	-0.51 (1.07)
Knowledge abortion * attitude abortion	0.97 (0.83)	1.39 (1.36)
Ν	476	206

Table 6: Multivariate regression models explaining the probability of a respondent voting YES in the secondreferendum on the Lisbon Treaty

As one would expect, many of the variables that explain the vote in 2009 also figure in the explanation of switching from NO to YES between 2008 and 2009. This is true in particular of the big-hitter variables (membership of the EU is a good thing and positive evaluation of the link between a YES vote and the prospects of economic recovery). Of particular interest are those variables whose effects are specific to YES versus NO in 2009 or to switching from NO to YES between 2008 and 2009.

Thus, some variables influenced the YES/NO choice in 2009 but did not affect the likelihood of switching from NO in 2008 to YES in 2009. These variables were: dissatisfaction with the incumbent government, Irish-only identity, attitude towards immigration and the view that various aspects of European integration have gone too far and too many decisions are made by the EU (see Table 6).

Just two variables were specific to the explanation of switching from NO to YES. They were social class (lower-middle class more likely to persist in voting NO than the upper-middle class) and the idea that Ireland should do everything to protect its neutrality. Those 2008 NO-voters who were concerned with Irish neutrality were more likely to switch to a YES in 2009.

# To vote or not to vote

At 59 per cent, turnout in the 2009 Lisbon referendum was the second highest of all the European referendums that have been held in Ireland and is only 8 percentage points lower than turnout in the 2007 general election. This contrasts sharply with the rate of participation in the first Nice referendum when turnout struggled to reach the one-third mark. From that low point, however, it rose steadily over the next three referendums to the 59 per cent just noted (see Figure 2). The question is: What drives turnout and, in particular, what drove the higher level of turnout in 2009?

	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	0.43 (0.44)	-0.50 (0.78)
Female	<b>-0.28</b> (0.17) *	0.05 (0.22)
Age	<b>1.23</b> (0.18) <b>**</b>	0.83 (0.24) **
Age (squared)	<b>-1.24</b> (0.33) **	-1.25 (0.42) **
Lower middle class	<b>0.17</b> (0.28)	0.69 (0.36) *
Skilled working class	<b>-0.33</b> (0.29)	0.22 (0.37)
Unskilled working class	<b>-0.34</b> (0.29)	0.73 (0.40) *
Farmer	0.39 (0.51)	2.17 (1.04) **
Secondary education	0.47 (0.32)	0.94 (0.45) **
Third level education	0.87 (0.40) **	0.86 (0.58)
Knowledge scale		<b>1.50</b> (0.26) **
Dissatisfied own economic situation		0.08 (0.23)
Yes vote improve economic prospects		<b>0.79</b> (0.25) **
Membership EU good		<b>0.25</b> (0.28)
rish only identity		<b>0.13</b> (0.24)
Big countries too much power		- <b>0.34</b> (0.20) *
Too many EU decisions		0.36 (0.27)
Dissatisfaction government		<b>-0.23</b> (0.34)
Close to opposition party		0.09 (0.27)
Not close to any party		<b>-0.46</b> (0.26) *
Ν	997	753

Table 7: Multivariate regression models explaining the probability of a respondent turning out to vote in the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty

Table 7 presents just two models of the determinants of turnout, one focusing exclusively on socio-demographic variables and the other adding in all the variables together in one comprehensive model. Just three socio-demographic variables—gender, age and third level education—affected turnout in the 2009 referendum. Thus, women were less likely to turn out to vote while older people and those with third level education were more likely to do so, with the caveat that the impact of age is twofold—turnout shows a linear increase with age up to a certain point but from about 70 to 75 years old it starts to decline with further advancing years. Thus, as the effects in Model 1 in Table 7 show, the relationship is in fact curvilinear.

The full model explaining turnout (Model 2 in Table 7) points to just four relevant attitudes. People were more likely to turn out to vote if they were more knowledgeable about the EU and if they believe that there is a link between a YES vote and an improvement in Ireland's economic prospects. However, they are less likely to vote if they feel disempowered by the EU (i.e. they believe that the big countries in the European Union have far too much power and influence) and/or if they do not feel any sense of attachment to any of the Irish political parties.

#### **Campaign effects**

In the run-up to a consequential referendum voters are bombarded with appeals of various sorts and through various communication channels to vote this way or that and to turn out to vote in the first place. Are any of these efforts effective? In order to explore this issue, we presented respondents with a list of sources of information and communication relating to the referendum and asked did the voters see any of these in the lead in to the referendum and, for each of the ones they saw, whether that source was very valuable, somewhat valuable or of little or no value.

	Use of s	source	Value of s	source
Official information	0.40	(0.39) *	1.14	(0.26) **
Campaign websites	-0.19	(0.28)	-0.27	(0.29)
Internet advertisements	-0.16	(0.29)	0.04	(0.23)
Canvassers calling to the home	0.03	(0.21)	-0.01	(0.24)
Campaign leaflets	-0.13	(0.30)	0.08	(0.24)
Free newspapers in churches	-0.37	(0.21) *	-0.42	(0.24) *
Discussion with family and friends	0.43	(0.29)	0.65	(0.23) **
Campaign posters	0.37	(0.38)	-0.13	(0.23)
Ν	606		658	

Table 8: Logistic regression with voting yes as dependent variable, based on the use and evaluation of campaign sources.

All models include the control variables for gender, age, social class and education. All independent variables are based on dummy variables which are '1' if any campaign source in a particular category was used or valued and '0' otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 8 presents the results of an analysis of voting YES taking exposure to and evaluation of selected aspects of the referendum campaign as the independent variables.<sup>11</sup> The results suggest that the propensity to vote YES is increased by exposure to and positive evaluation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> In the survey questions were asked about the usage and evaluation of specific media outlets and campaign information sources, as well as about voting behaviour in the referendum. In the analysis below we will look at the relation between these variables-to what extent users of particular media show particular patterns of voting behaviour. It should be pointed out, however, that one should be cautious in drawing strong causal inferences from these correlations. The impact of media on political behaviour is a notoriously difficult topic in political science and a thorough study of this relationship requires highly advanced and careful research designs, including experimental and longitudinal designs. With an observation at one point in time, like the survey at hand, we cannot decide whether it is attitudes affecting preferences for particular media or particular media affecting attitudes. Furthermore, the extent to which a voter will consider a particular media outlet "useful" is likely to be related to whether this media outlet expressed an attitude in line with that of the respondent in the first place, and thus does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship between the two. Finally, the survey does not contain sufficient questions on political interest and cynicism to control fully for these relevant variables.

of official sources of information (the government booklet and postcard and the materials published by the Referendum Commission). Voters who positively evaluate discussing the referendum with friends and family were also more likely to vote YES. The propensity to vote NO was increased by both exposure to and positive evaluation of the source described in the questionnaire as "leaflets or free newspapers available in churches advocating a NO vote".

	Use	of source	Value	e of source
Official information	1.48	(0.30) **	1.08	(0.21) **
Campaign websites	0.05	(0.36)	0.26	(0.35)
Internet advertisements	0.49	(0.34)	0.77	(0.40) *
Canvassers calling to the home	-0.03	(0.21)	-0.12	(0.24)
Campaign leaflets	0.15	(0.30)	0.53	(0.24) **
Free newspapers in churches	0.02	(0.23)	-0.38	(0.27)
Discussion with family and friends	0.89	(0.27) **	0.61	(0.22) **
Campaign posters	0.07	(0.39)	0.15	(0.24)
N		783	864	

Table 9: Logistic regression with voting as dependent variable (i.e. turnout), based on the use and evaluation of campaign sources.

All models include the control variables for gender, age, social class and education. All independent variables are based on dummy variables which are '1' if any campaign source in a particular category was used or valued and '0' otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.

Of course all these various campaign efforts may indirectly affect the YES/NO outcome by mobilising people to get out and vote. Accordingly, Table 9 seeks to assess the impact on turnout of the various campaigns and channels of communication. This shows that higher levels of turnout were associated with exposure to official information and to discussion

with family and friends. Turnout was also increased by regarding the following sources as either somewhat valuable or very valuable: official information (government, referendum commission etc., leaflets from the various campaigns, internet advertisements and, once again, discussion with family and friends.

#### **Media effects**

As well as being affected by the various demographic, attitudinal and campaign factors considered so far, voting behaviour in the referendum may well have been conditioned by the media that channelled so much of the debate and of the campaigning efforts of the protagonists to the eyes, ears and minds of the voters. Analysis of this conditioning, if indeed it occurs, is complicated by three factors—by the efforts of most media to be balanced in their coverage, by the potential intertwining of media consumption and class and educational factors and by the sheer number of media outlets involved. In order to overcome at least some of the difficulty that all this gives rise to, we have conducted separate regression analyses for each media type (TV, radio and newspapers) taking YES/NO and turnout as the dependent variables and a selection<sup>12</sup> of outlets within each type of media as the independent variables. We have run the analysis with demographic control variables included, but not presented. Table 10 presents the outcome of the analysis of voting YES/NO.

Taking television first, the results show two effects of this medium on vote choice. The first is that regular watching of the RTE current affairs programme Prime Time is clearly associated with voting YES, while regularly watching of Tonight with Vincent Browne a half an hour later is equally clearly associated with voting NO<sup>13</sup>. In terms of radio listenership, the clearest effect is that listening to local radio stations is associated with voting NO. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Including all television shows, radio programmes, and newspapers in the regression explaining the outcome of the vote would lead to problems of multicollinearity. That is to say, most people who listen to one RTE Radio 1 news or current affairs programme, for example, also tend to listen to the other current affairs programmes on the same channel. In the regression analysis it is then impossible to clearly distinguish between the effects of the various radio programmes, and the conclusion would be that there is no clear effect visible, even if taken together, listening to Radio 1 has a clear effect. For that reason, on the basis of some factor analysis results not presented here, the most frequently used media outlets of each group of outlets has been included in the regression analysis, and the other outlets have been left out.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> These findings have to be interpreted with caution as the data are not capable of demonstrating causality or the direction it might take.

analysis also shows that there are two newspapers that appear to have negative effects on the tendency to vote YES, namely the Irish Daily Mail and Alive.

		М	odel 1	М	odel 2	М	odel 3
TV	RTE News	0.16	(0.21)				
	Prime Time	0.51	(0.23) **				
	Vincent Browne	-0.43	(0.20) **				
Radio	Local			-0.37	(0.17) **		
	News One			0.29	(0.20)		
	Today FM			0.03	(0.18)		
	Morning Ireland			-0.18	(0.19)		
Newspapers	Local					-0.09	(0.19)
	Irish Independent					0.25	(0.18)
	Sunday World					0.29	(0.22)
	Irish Daily Mail					-0.31	(0.19) *
	Irish Sun					0.14	(0.23)
	Irish Times					0.30	(0.19)
	Alive					-0.47	(0.19) **
	N	748		732		716	

Table 10: Logistic regression with voting yes as dependent variable, based on the regular use of various media outlets.

All models include the control variables for gender, age, social class and education. All independent variables are based on standardized 7-point scales. Standard errors in parentheses.

Focusing on turnout as the dependent variable, Table 11 shows a wider range of media effects. Thus, on the television front, regular watching of RTE News or RTE Prime Time is associated with higher turnout as is listening to Morning Ireland and Today FM and as is also regular readership of the Irish Independent. Just one newspaper readership—that of the Irish Sun—is associated with lower turnout.

		М	odel 1	М	odel 2	М	odel 3
τν	RTE News	0.39	(0.18) **				
	Prime Time	0.56	(0.21) **				
	Vincent Browne	0.32	(0.20)				
Radio	Local			-0.06	(0.17)		
	News One			0.02	(0.19)		
	Today FM			0.30	(0.17) *		
	Morning Ireland			0.41	(0.20) **		
Newspapers	Local					0.05	(0.18)
	Irish Independent					0.35	(0.19) *
	Sunday World					0.19	(0.18)
	Irish Daily Mail					0.11	(0.19)
	Irish Sun					-0.44	(0.18) **
	Irish Times					0.34	(0.22)
	Alive					0.40	(0.26)
	Ν	989		971		943	

Table 11: Logistic regression with voting (turnout) as dependent variable, based on the regular use of various media outlets.

All models include the control variables for gender, age, social class and education. All independent variables are based on standardized 7-point scales. Standard errors in parentheses.

#### Summary and conclusions

As part of its policy of "communicating Europe", the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs commissioned a post-referendum poll after the second Irish referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon that was held in October 2009. Our analysis of the data mainly from this poll but also from the poll conducted after the first Lisbon referendum enables us to draw some conclusions about this particular pair of referendums and, more generally, about attitudes and behaviour in Irish referendums on European Union treaties.

Firstly, the short answer to the question as to how the YES side won the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is that its 2008 vote remained remarkably solid (to the tune of 87 per cent), that it managed to persuade one in four of those who had voted NO to switch to YES and that, despite a high rate (73 per cent) of persistent abstention, it succeeded in mobilizing in its own favour the votes of one-sixth of those who had abstained in 2008. But, while this helps in answering the "what happened" question, it falls far short of explaining the behaviour of the voters in the sense of providing a basis for understanding who voted which way and why.

Demographic analysis of the YES/NO vote takes us some distance in that direction. The main observation here is that, in comparison with those in upper middle class occupations, there was a substantial propensity for voters with lower middle class or skilled or unskilled working class occupations and for small farmers to vote NO. However, taking account of these socio-demographic factors and of a range of additional attitudinal indicators shows that two main attitudes influenced vote choice in the second Lisbon referendum.

The first of these two attitudes is the belief that Irish membership of the EU is a good thing. This belief is a widely distributed and stable aspect of Irish people's political outlook. On the other hand, although it is held by a clear majority of the adult population, it is not a sufficient condition for the passage of EU referendums. Something else is needed. In the second Lisbon referendum the second ingredient was the economy and specifically the belief that the YES vote would result in an improvement in Ireland's economic prospects. The evidence also indicates that, compared to this positive overall economic expectation, negative voter assessments of their own economic situation had no discernible effect on vote choice. In short, there is no evidence that voters were panicked by economic adversity into voting YES.

Other things also helped the YES side. Thus, awareness of the assurances/guarantees regarding the issues of a permanent commissioner and control of taxation policy tended to be associated with a YES vote. It was also helpful to the YES side that domestic politics, specifically the extensive unpopularity of the incumbent government, had only a limited effect on vote choice. In this sense, the referendum was mainly about what European referendums ought to be about, namely Europe-related issues. This positive assessment of

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what one might call the "quality" of the referendum is confirmed by the evidence that, when the full range of attitudes to EU issues is taken into account, knowledge of the EU did not affect vote choice in the way that it had done in the first Lisbon referendum. The 2009 referendum was more about the issues than about how much people knew about the issues.

There were of course other attitudes that worked in favour of the NO side. These included

- opposition to the further integration of European foreign policy;
- having an Irish-only identity (as opposed to some combination of European and Irish identity);
- believing that big countries have too much power;
- believing that European integration has gone too far;
- taking the view that there is too much EU regulation in general and specifically in relation to companies.

This debate and discussion did not, of course occur in a vacuum. The government itself, the referendum commission, the political parties, individual government and opposition political leaders, politicians and political activists, business and trade union leaders and other prominent "civil society" figures argued their case and appealed for support for their side. It is clear also that there was extensive informal discussion within families and groups of friends and acquaintances. All of this was covered and amplified by the media. Subject to the qualification regarding not being able to be certain about the direction of causation, some of the main campaign and media "effects" can be identified and are documented in the text and in the tables of this report.

In addition to the particular findings in our report that may help to inform planning and preparation for future referendums, our research clearly illustrates the inherently challenging nature of the referendum process. Referendums challenge societies, governments, political parties, civil society and, not least, individual electors. An example in the Irish case is the challenge of bridging what seems to be a potential class divide on the issues raised in recent EU referendums. The tendency for class effects to "disappear" when

attitudinal variables are added to the models suggests that the class differences involved can be overcome and provides some indications as to how this might be done. However, the best preparation for meeting this and other challenges in European referendums is enhanced deliberation and debate about European issues on a continuing basis and certainly before, not after, referendum battle is joined. Appendix:

**Questionnaire and Frequencies** 

# Public Opinion Poll Topline Results © Millward Brown Lansdowne: May 2010

# Base: All Adults Aged 18+ (n=1,000) Unless Otherwise Stated Fieldwork Dates: 20<sup>th</sup> – 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2009

A	Are you a citizen of Ireland?	• Yes	
В	Is your name on the Electoral Register that is the list of those entitled to vote?	• Yes	
Q.1a)	<b>On the 2<sup>nd</sup> October last, a referendum</b> <b>was held on the Treaty of Lisbon.</b> As you may remember, many people did not vote in that referendum. How about you? Did you vote in the referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon that was held in October?	%         Yes – voted	
Base: A	All Respondents ( $n = 1002$ )		

# IF VOTED (CODE 1 AT Q.1a) ASK, OTHERS GO TO Q3

Q.1b) How did you vote in that referendum - in favour or against the Lisbon Treaty?Base: All who voted in referendum (n = 756)

<b>)</b> .		
	%	
	• Yes	
	• No	

0%

	SHOW CARD "1"
Q.1c)	Using this card, can you tell me
	roughly when did you make up
	your mind how you would vote in
	that referendum?
Base: A	All who voted in referendum ( $n =$
	756)

Q.2a) What were the main reasons why you voted in **Favour/Against** (AS APPROPRIATE) the Lisbon Treaty in the referendum last month? PROBE FULLY AS FOLLOWS: Were there any other reasons? And anything else? RECORD VERBATIM ALL RESPONSES GIVEN

Q.2b For as far as you can remember, which people, organisations, or news sources were the main **influence on your decision** to vote in favour / against (as appropriate) the Lisbon Treaty?

Q.3	IF DID NOT VOTE (CODE 2 AT Q.1a) Why did you not vote? PROBE FULLY AS FOLLOWS: Were RECORD VERBATIM ALL RESPONS	there any other reasons? And anything else?	
Q.4	Almost a year and a half ago, in June 2008, a first referendum was held on the Lisbon Treaty. Did you vote in that referendum held in June last year?	<ul> <li>Yes - voted</li></ul>	
Base:	All Respondents ( $n = 1002$ )	<b>#</b>	
Q.5	<b>IF VOTED</b> ( <b>CODE 1 AT Q4</b> ) <b>ASK: OT</b> How did you vote in that referendum in June last year – in favour or against the Lisbon Treaty?	HERS GO TO Q.6 • Yes	
Base:	All who voted in referendum in June ( $n = 72$	24)	
Q.6	ASK ALL In the near future, do you see yourself as? READ OUT → All Respondents (n = 1002)	%         Irish only	

# SHOW CARD "2"

ſ

Q.7 By the date of the referendum (2<sup>nd</sup> October), how good was your understanding of the issues involved? Please use this card to choose the phrase that applies best to you.

		%
•	I had a good understanding of what the Treaty was all about 1	.9
•	I understood some of the issues but not all that was involved	35
•	I was only vaguely aware of the issues involved	27
•	I did not know what the Treaty was about at all 1	9
•	Don't Know/NA	*

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

1

Т

# SHOW CARD "3"

Q.8 And how about the European Union in general? Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions?

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

$1 \\ 2 $	% Nothing at all10 	
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8	9	
9	2	
10 🕈	Know a great deal2	
Don't k	now1	

Q.9 For each of the following statements about the European Union could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false?

READ OUT 🗸	Irue	False	Know
The EU currently consists of fifteen Member States	32	43	24
Switzerland is a member of the European Union	23	51	26
The name of the President of the European Commission is Barroso	51	11	39
The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the			
citizens of the EU%	59	16	25

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

# SHOW CARD "3B"

Q.10 In light of the guarantees obtained by the Irish Government, which, if any, of the following items were included or not included in the revised proposal that people were asked to vote on in the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty? READ OUT AND RECORD YES OR NO FOR EACH STATEMENT

READ OUT ♥				
TICK START & ROTATE	Yes, included in Proposal	No, not included in Proposal	Don't Know	
a) Improved protection of workers' rights	57	15	28	
b) The erosion of Irish neutrality %	39	34	27	
c) Ending of Ireland's right to decide its own corporate tax rate %	31	32	37	
d) The introduction of conscription to a European army $\%$	24	45	31	
e) Improved efficiency of EU decision-making%	54	14	32	
f) Strengthening Europe's role in the world%	62	11	26	
g) The Charter of Fundamental Rights%	48	12	40	
h) Loss of Irish commissioner for 5 out of every 15 years %	32	30	38	
i) The reduction of Ireland's voting strength in the Council of				
Ministers%	31	27	42	
j) The end of Ireland's control over its policy on abortion	27	44	29	
k) Strengthening the role of National Parliaments in EU decision-				
making%	40	17	43	

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

Don't

O.11 Generally speaking, do you think that Ireland's membership of the European Union is ...? READ OUT ->

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

# SHOW CARD "4"

Q.12 Do you think that, as a result of the YES vote in the recent Lisbon Treaty referendum, Ireland's influence in the European Union has been strengthened, weakened or remains unchanged?

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

# % • Neither good nor bad......20 Don't know.....7

- % Don't know ...... 10
- SHOW CARD "5" Q.13 Do you think that, as a result of the YES vote in the Lisbon Treaty referendum, Ireland's economic prospects have been improved or disimproved or remain unchanged?

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

	%
• Very much improved	6
<ul> <li>Somewhat improved</li> </ul>	
Unchanged	
• Somewhat disimproved	
• Very much disimproved	
• Don't know	

I have a number of statements here that people sometimes make. I would like you to indicate on this scale which of Q.14 each pair of opposing statements comes closest to your view. A score of one would indicate that you agree fully with the statement on the left. A score of nine would indicate that you agree fully with the statement on the right. Of course your view could be somewhere in between. Also of course there may be issues that you have no particular view on. If so, please just say this and we will move on to the next item. SINGLE CODE FOR EACH

## Q.14a) SHOW CARD "6"

power to	should have o fully contr te taxation i	ol its					have the common co	an Union should power to set a orporate tax rate out the Union	No Opinion/ Don't Know	
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Х	
34	19	10	6	8	3	2	3	4	11	

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

Q.14ai How important would you say this issue of corporate taxation is to you personally? Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

	%
<ul> <li>Very important</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Important</li> </ul>	
• Neither/nor	
<ul> <li>Not very important</li> </ul>	7
• Not at all important	
Don't know	

# Q.14b) SHOW CARD "7"

Europea too m	countries in n Union hav uch power a nfluence	ve far					Europear able to d	countries in the n Union are well efend their own nterests	No Opinion/ Don't Know	
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Х	
25	17	11	6	9	6	7	5	8	6	

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

Q.14bi How important would you say this issue of small or big countries' influence on European Union decision-making is to you personally?

Base: A	<b>ll Respondents</b>	(n = 1002)
---------	-----------------------	------------

ot at all important 1 on't know*
-------------------------------------

#### Q.14c) SHOW CARD "8"

	to						nd should be willing ccept limitations on its neutrality	No Opinion/ Don't Know
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Х
19	13	5	9	4	3	4	2	6
	n its neutro % 2	2 3	m its neutrality           %         %           2         3         4	m its neutrality           %         %         %           2         3         4         5	m its neutrality         %	m its neutrality         %	ting it can to n its neutrality     to a       %     %     %     %     %     %       2     3     4     5     6     7     8	ting it can to n its neutrality         to accept limitations on its neutrality           % <t< td=""></t<>

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

Q.14ci How important would you say this issue of Irish neutrality is to you personally?Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

%         • Very important
----------------------------

#### Q.14d) SHOW CARD "9"

emphasis	hould be m on the prote rkers' right	ection					e	ere should be less emphasis on the tection of workers' rights	No Opinion/ Don't Know
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Х
47	19	13	5	5	2	2	2	1	3

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

Q.14di How important would you say this issue of the protection of workers' rights is to you personally?

	%
<ul> <li>Very important</li> </ul>	
Important	
• Neither/nor	
• Not very important	2
• Not at all important	
Don't know	*

# Q.14e) SHOW CARD "10"

There should be a total ban on abortion in Ireland							avail wo	No Opinion/ Don't Know	
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Х
18	7	6	5	12	11	9	10	15	8

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

Q.14ei	How impor	rtant would you say this issue of
	abortion is	to you personally?
		/

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

%	
<ul> <li>Very important</li></ul>	
<ul> <li>Important</li></ul>	
• Neither/nor	
<ul> <li>Not very important</li></ul>	
<ul> <li>Not at all important</li></ul>	
Don't know*	

# Q.14f SHOW CARD "11"

should be the regu	ropean Uni less involv lation of sn s and enter	ed in nall					shou in the	e European Union Id be more involved e regulation of small companies and enterprises	No Opinion/ Don't Know
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Х
19	13	11	8	13	8	6	5	7	11

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

Q.14fi How important would you say this issue of European regulation of small companies and enterprises is to you personally?Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

	%
<ul> <li>Very important</li> </ul>	22
Important	41
<ul> <li>Neither/nor</li> </ul>	28
<ul> <li>Not very important</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Not at all important</li> </ul>	
Don't know	

# Q.14g) SHOW CARD "12"

further ir European	ould suppo itegration of Union in de preign polic	f the fence	participate in integration of th Union in def				land should not ipate in the further tion of the European on in defence and foreign policy	No Opinion/ Don't Know	
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Х
8	8	9	9	14	9	6	8	11	18

Q.14gi	How important would you say this issue of
	Irish foreign affairs is to you personally?
Base: A	All Respondents ( $n = 1002$ )

%	
<ul> <li>Very important17</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Important</li></ul>	
• Neither/nor	
<ul> <li>Not very important7</li> </ul>	
• Not at all important	
• Don't know	

# Q.14h) SHOW CARD "13"

uropean unification has already gone too far					Eu shou	No Opinion/ Don't Know			
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Χ
16	10	9	6	15	13	6	5	8	14

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

# Q.14hi How important would you say this issue of European unification is to you personally?

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

<ul> <li>Very important</li></ul>	3 1 5 2
-----------------------------------	------------------

# Q.14i) SHOW CARD "14"

from othe made li	ming to live er countries reland a mu place to liv	has ch					here has r	ople coming to live from other countries nade Ireland a much etter place to live	No Opinion/ Don't Know
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Х
19	10	9	7	13	12	11	8	6	4

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

Q.14ii	How important would you say this issue of
	immigration is to you personally?
Base: A	All Respondents ( $n = 1002$ )

Q.15 There has been some discussion recently about the need for more efficient decisionmaking in the European Union. How important would you say this issue of efficient decision-making in the European Union is to you personally?

	%
<ul> <li>Very important</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Important</li> </ul>	
• Neither/nor	
<ul> <li>Not very important</li> </ul>	
• Not at all important	
<ul> <li>Don't know</li> </ul>	

%	
• Very important	
• Important	
• Neither/nor	
• Not very important	
• Not at all important2	
• Don't know*	

Q.16	How important to you personally is it that
	there will always be an Irish member of the
	European Commission?

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

	%	
	<ul> <li>Very important</li></ul>	
;	• Important	
	• Neither/nor	
	<ul> <li>Not very important</li></ul>	
	• Not at all important 1	
	<ul> <li>Don't know</li></ul>	

# SHOW CARD "15"

Q.17 There has been a lot of discussion recently about the European Union. Some people say that too many issues are decided on by the European Union, others say that more issues should be decided on by the European Union. Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?

	%
a. Too many issues are decided on by the European Union	29
b. The number of issues decided on by the European Union at present is about right	21
c. More issues should be decided on by the European Union	8
d. I have not really thought about it	15
e. It depends on the issue	
f. Don't know	8

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

# SHOW CARD "16"

- Q.18a There are many different ways in which people get information in relation to referendums. I have a list here of several possible sources of information. Using this card, which of these sources did you see in the lead up to the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty on 2<sup>nd</sup> October?
- Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

Q.18b For each of the ones that you saw, would you say the source has been very valuable, somewhat valuable, or of little or no value? Base: All seeing a) Materials published... etc

		r	0.40		1		<b>0</b> 1	
			Q.18a			Q.1	da	
		Did see/	Did not See /	Don't	Very	Some- what	Little or no	Don't
		Hear	Hear	Know	Valuable	Valuable	Value	know
	Materials published by the Referendum							
	Commission%	64	30	6	48	48	28	3
	The booklet put out by the Government%	80	16	4	45	45	31	4
	The postcard sent out by the Government%	53	38	9	44	44	35	
	YES campaign websites%	21	72	6	46	46	26	8
	NO campaign websites%	21	73	6	47	47	28	7
	Social networking sites (such as Facebook)%	12	81	7	36	36	30	13
5.	Internet advertisements put out by the YES							
	campaign%	15	80	6	34	34	38	12
1.	Internet advertisements put out by the NO							
		14	80	7	31	31	43	13
	Emails canvassing for a YES vote%	10	83	7	32 32	32	38	15
	Emails canvassing for a NO vote%	10	83	7	32	32	41	12
•	Canvassers calling to my home							
	campaigning for a YES vote%	54	41	5	37	37	41	3
	Canvassers calling to my home							
	campaigning for a NO vote%	50	44	5	35	35	41	4
1.	Leaflets/brochures circulated by the parties							
	and organisations campaigning for a YES							
	vote%	78	18	4	43	43	39	4
•	Leaflets/brochures circulated by the parties							
	and organisations campaigning for a NO				•	•		
		74	22	4	38	38	44	3
	Leaflets or free newspapers available in					10	• •	
	churches advocating a NO vote%	36	57	6	40	40	29	8
	Discussion with family, friends and		17		10	10	16	2
	colleagues% YES posters on poles and billboards%		[7]	6		43	16	3
ŀ	YES posters on poles and billboards%	89	8	3	25	25	58	6
	NO posters on poles and billboards%	84	12	4	23	23	60	5

## ASK ALL SHOW CARD "17"

- Q.19 Overall are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the government is running the country? SINGLE CODEBase: All Respondents (n = 1002)
- Q.20 What about your own economic situation these days? Would you say it is...? **READ OUT – SINGLE CODE** Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

- Don't Know/NA ...... 4

# • Very good % • Fairly good 41 • Fairly bad 35 • Very bad 17 • Don't Know/NA 3

# SHOW CARD "18"

Q.21 On a scale from 0 - 7, where 0 means never and 7 means very regularly, how often do you watch the following television programmes?

READ OUT ↓	Never 0 ◀	1	2	3	4	5	6	Very Regularly 7 ►	Don't know
a) The Late Late Show	15	7	7	8	9	12	13	29	*
b) RTE News	4	2	4	7	7	12	19	45	*
c) Prime Time %	19	8	9	10	11	13	10	20	*
d) The Week in Politics	40	16	8	9	8	5	4	9	1
e) Nightly News with Vincent Browne %		14	8	9	8	7	6	11	1
f) Other news and current affairs									
programmes%	18	8	9	15	13	12	9	14	1

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

# SHOW CARD "18" AGAIN

Q.22 On a scale from 0 - 7, where 0 means never and 7 means very regularly, how often do you listen to the following radio programmes or stations?

								Very	Don't
READ OUT ↓	Never							Regularly	know
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
		1					I.	-	
a) Morning Ireland%									
b) Liveline%	45	10	10	9	6	6	4	9	1
c) Marian Finucane %	46	12	9	8	7	5	4	7	1
d) News at One	33	7	6	8	8	9	10	16	1
e) Today with Pat Kenny %	45	13	9	10	6	5	5	7	1
f) Mary Wilson Drivetime	54	13	6	6	5	6	3	5	2
g) Today FM %	34	10	9	10	10	11	7	9	1
h) Newstalk%	42	12	10	9	6	7	7	6	1
i) Other news and current affairs									
programmes%	36	10	11	13	10	8	6	6	2
j) Local radio station %	19	7	5	7	8	8	13	32	1

## SHOW CARD "18" AGAIN

Q.23 On a scale from 0 - 7, where 0 means never and 7 means very regularly, how often do you read the following newspapers?

READ OUT V	Never							Very Regularly	Don't know
······	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
a) The Irish Times%	54	10	6	6	5	5	2	10	3
b) The Irish Independent%								15	
c) The Irish Examiner%	63	7	4	5	4	4	3	7	3
d) The Sunday Times%	61	11	4	4	3	4	3	7	4
e) The Sunday Independent%	45	7	7	6	6	6	5	15	3
f) The Sunday Tribune%	66	11	6	3	2	2	2	3	3
g) The Sunday Business Post	70	10	4	3	3	2	2	3	3
h) The Sunday World %	49	7	5	7	6	5	6	13	3
i) Metro or Herald AM %	69	10	3	2	3	2	3	3	4
j) The Irish Sun%	56	9	4	6	5	5	5	9	3
k) The Star%	50	9	4	7	6	6	5	11	2
1) The Irish Daily Mail%	60	10	7	5	5	2	3	4	3
m) The Farmers Journal	74	10	3	2	1	1	1	4	3
n) Alive!%	81	9	2	1	1	2	1	1	3
o) Local newspaper%	25	5	4	4	6	7	12	35	2
p) Other newspapers%	52	8	6	6	4	3	4	11	5


Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

- Q.24 Thinking about the last general election for the Dáil, in 2007, as far as you can remember, did you vote in that election?Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)
- Q.25a) Do you feel close to any of the political parties?
  IF YES PROBE: Which one is that? SINGLE CODE
  Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)

#### IF NO ASK:

Q.25b) Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?
IF YES – PROBE: Which one is that?

Base: All Respondents (n = 1002)



# SHOW CARD "19"

Q.26 One last question about the referendum: some of the following items were part of the guarantees obtained by the Irish Government following the first referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. As far as you can remember, which ones were part of the guarantees and which ones were not?

READ OUT ↓	Yes in the guarantees	No, not in the guarantees	Don't know/Not stated
a) No more countries to join the European Union%		58	31
b) Ireland retains control of sensitive ethical issues,			
such as abortion%		13	23
c) Ireland will remain in control of its own tax rates%		16	
d) Direct election of all members of the European			
Commission%			40
e) Ireland to have more seats in the European			
Parliament%			
f) Ireland and all other member states will keep a			
Commissioner%		9	23

# **CLASSIFICATION DETAILS**

NAME:		
ADDRESS:		
TELEPHONE:		
-		
(If proprietor/manage	IEAD OF HOUSEHOLD: r, state no. of employees. I ord full details & code under	
SEX:		% 40
MARITAL STATUS		
Married/living as mar	ried	. 57
Single		. 33
Widowed/divorced/se	eparated	. 10
AGE		
(STATE EXACT)	[]	
& CODE:-		%
		, =
-		-
00+		. 15
CLASS:		%
		,
-		
1 30		Z
REGION:		
		10
Munster		. 28
Connacht/Ulster		. 18
AREA:		07.
		% 61

Housewife       18         *Self-employed       11         * Employee       44         Unemployed/searching for a job       7         Unemployed/not searching for a job       4         Student       5         Retired       11
* IF SELF EMPLOYED/EMPLOYEE STATE INDUSTRY TYPE: %
Building/construction
Computers / IT
Finance6
Agriculture9
Food production2
Government/Civil Service/Teaching/Healthcare17
Leisure
Manufacturing3
Media1
Professionals (Doc, lawyer, accountant, architect)2
Retail/wholesale/distribution1
Tourism/travel
Other Services
Other write in4
RESPONDENT WORKS IN:       %         Public sector       26         Private sector       74
FINISHED EDUCATION: %
At primary level
At secondary level
At third level
Still at school/college5
ATTENDS MASS/CHURCH SERVICE: %
Doily 9
Daily2 Weekly 35
Weekly35
Weekly35 Several times a month11
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14
Weekly       35         Several times a month       11         Only occasionally       37         Never       14         NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent)       %
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent) $1 \rightarrow 11\%$ % $6 \rightarrow 4\%$
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent) $1 \rightarrow 11\%$ $6 \rightarrow 4\%$ $2 \rightarrow 28\%$ $7 \rightarrow 2\%$
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent) $1 \rightarrow 11\%$ $6 \rightarrow 4\%$ $2 \rightarrow 28\%$ $7 \rightarrow 2\%$ $3 \rightarrow 22\%$ $8 \rightarrow *$
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent) $1 \rightarrow 11\%$ $6 \rightarrow 4\%$ $2 \rightarrow 28\%$ $7 \rightarrow 2\%$ $3 \rightarrow 22\%$ $8 \rightarrow *$ $4 \rightarrow 23\%$ $9+ \rightarrow *$
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent) $1 \rightarrow 11\%$ $6 \rightarrow 4\%$ $2 \rightarrow 28\%$ $7 \rightarrow 2\%$ $3 \rightarrow 22\%$ $8 \rightarrow *$
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent) $1 \rightarrow 11\%$ $6 \rightarrow 4\%$ $2 \rightarrow 28\%$ $7 \rightarrow 2\%$ $3 \rightarrow 22\%$ $8 \rightarrow *$ $4 \rightarrow 23\%$ $9+ \rightarrow *$
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent) $1 \rightarrow 11\%$ $6 \rightarrow 4\%$ $2 \rightarrow 28\%$ $7 \rightarrow 2\%$ $3 \rightarrow 22\%$ $8 \rightarrow *$ $4 \rightarrow 23\%$ $9+ \rightarrow *$
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent) $1 \rightarrow 11\%$ $6 \rightarrow 4\%$ $2 \rightarrow 28\%$ $7 \rightarrow 2\%$ $3 \rightarrow 22\%$ $8 \rightarrow *$ $4 \rightarrow 23\%$ $9+ \rightarrow *$
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent) $1 \rightarrow 11\%$ $6 \rightarrow 4\%$ $2 \rightarrow 28\%$ $7 \rightarrow 2\%$ $3 \rightarrow 22\%$ $8 \rightarrow *$ $4 \rightarrow 23\%$ $9+ \rightarrow *$
Weekly35Several times a month11Only occasionally37Never14NO. OF PEOPLE IN H'HOLD (Incl Respondent) $1 \rightarrow 11\%$ $6 \rightarrow 4\%$ $2 \rightarrow 28\%$ $7 \rightarrow 2\%$ $3 \rightarrow 22\%$ $8 \rightarrow *$ $4 \rightarrow 23\%$ $9+ \rightarrow *$